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Abstract
This paper analyzes the dynamic effects of a fiscal policy shock and its transmission
mechanism in a small open economy and compares the responses under different speci-
fications of the utility function. The traditional Mundell-Flemming model tells that fiscal
policy is more effective under a peg than under a float. This result is not confirmed for
a baseline small open economy model with separable preferences. The present paper of-
fers a survey of non-separable utility found in the literature on fiscal policy shocks and
compares their implications for the transmission mechanism. The aim is to overturn the
negative wealth effect of an increase in government spending, which causes a decrease in
private consumption under the baseline separable utility function. Using a plausible cal-
ibration of the model, I find that if the complementarity between consumption and hours
worked is large enough, then the response of private consumption is likely to be positive,
although the assumptions have to be strong. This result holds for any specification of
exchange rate regime.
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1 Introduction
Is the response of private consumption to a fiscal policy shock positive in an open economy frame-
work? The debate surrounding this question has received a renewed attention in empirical studies
based on vector autoregressions (VAR). Most empirical studies applying a VAR based on a sluggish
reaction of output, private consumption and other key variables to fiscal policy shocks1 find a sig-
nificant positive response of private consumption. The recent study by Mountford and Uhlig (2009)
applying the approach of a fixed effects VAR with sign-restrictions finds that “private consumption
does not fall in response to an unexpected increase in government spending. However, in contrast to the other
studies, we do not find that consumption rises strongly.” In contrast to the effects of fiscal shocks to output
and consumption, the effect of government spending shocks on the external sector has received con-
siderably little attention. Notable exceptions are the studies by Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013),
Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2012) and Monacelli and Perotti (2006), who find significant posi-
tive effects on consumption and apart a real depreciation of the exchange rate. These findings stand
in contrast with the Mundel-Flemming model and call for a theoretic DSGE model with nominal
rigidities and a well specified household sector.
The present paper has the aim to fill this gap and investigates the transmission mechanism of a
fiscal policy shock in a DSGE small open economy framework by numerical simulations. A similar
model approach has been followed by Monacelli and Perotti (2006), who show that a baseline small
open economy model featuring non-separable preferences is able to generate a positive consumption
response and induces a real exchange rate depreciation. The present paper is an extension to the
existing literature on responses of fiscal policy shocks as it compares different specifications of utility
functions frequently applied in the business cycle literature. I will show that the results obtained in
Monacelli and Perotti (2006) cannot be generalized easily.
This paper demonstrates that a positive response of private consumption to an increases in gov-
ernment spending can be explained by adopting a utility function that satisfies the following condi-
tions: First it is necessary that the utility function has to be additively non-separable in consumption
and hours worked, so that households have the desire to consume more when they work more. Sec-
ond, in order to obtain a positive response, the complementarity must be strong enough to offset
the wealth effect implied by a fiscal spending shock. Particularly, the standard representative agent
model with separable preferences predicts that as the government increases its spending, it with-
draws resources from the private sector, reducing thereby private wealth. As households expect
the government to increase the taxes to balance its budget, they increase labor supply through di-
minished demand for leisure, which decreases consequently the real wage and drives down private
consumption.
In recent studies, Linnemann (2006), Bilbiie (2009), Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2012) as well
as Hall (2009) put focus on the consumption response of a government spending shock in a closed
economy. While these studies focus on the specification of the household sector, another approach
1For example in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Gali, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007)
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that deserves to be mentioned has been successful in overcoming the negative wealth effect to a gov-
ernment spending shock. Gali, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) show that with the inclusion of a
fraction of consumers that cannot participate in international financial asset markets a positive re-
sponse of consumption can be obtained. Notwithstanding the Rule-of-Thumb consumers contradict
the rational expectations hypothesis and offset Ricardian equivalence, which is why I will not include
such a consumer type in the present paper.
Furthermore, this paper confronts various utility functions with specific exchange rate regimes
in order to analyze the transmission mechanism induced. Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012) and
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) perform empirical investigations of fiscal shocks under different
exchange rates. While the former don’t find a significant difference of the consumption response
under a peg and float, the latter show a significantly higher consumption response under a peg. By
extending the framework to an open economy, the transmission mechanism is amplified to have ef-
fects on the real exchange rate, as consumers are now able to buy goods in the domestic as well as
in the foreign economy. The starting point for an analysis of open economy models is usually the
textbook version of the Mundell-Flemming model. The model predicts that in a small open economy
with the foreign interest rate and foreign prices given exogenously, an expansion in government con-
sumption has a large multiplier effect on output under fixed exchange rates, whereas with floating
exchange rates it just crowds out net exports one-to-one. The numerical simulations for the various
utility functions under a floating exchange rate regime show, that the traditional wisdom of a total
crowding-out of output is not supported. Nevertheless, the relative response of output and con-
sumption are higher under a peg than under a float, reinforcing the result of the Mundell-Flemming
model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in section 2, I present the basic structure
of the model and its calibration. Section 3 outlines five types of utility functions and their ability
to overturn the wealth effect. In section 4 the numerical simulations are performed under different
exchange rate regimes, and section 5 extends the model with habits and another utility specification.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Canonical model
I am considering an economic framework which is a variant of the basic small open economy stud-
ied in the paper by Gali and Monacelli (2005).2 The present model implements nominal frictions
with staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983) and portfolio adjustment costs. On the real side, the
presented model deviates from the standard literature by imposing a variety of specifications of the
utility function, or by the possibility of habit formation (see subsection 5.1). To keep things simple,
I will stick to a general notation of the utility function in a first step and come back to the specific
forms in the next section.
2The theoretical model builds in large parts upon the Suite of Models for Dynare by F.Collard, H.Dellas and B.Diba,
University of Bern, 2011
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2.1 Households
The economy is composed of a continuum of infinitely-lived households, whose total is normalized
to unity, and of a continuum of firms, who are owned by the households. The household in the
representative domestic economy seeks to maximize lifetime utility
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtU(ct, ht) (2.1)
with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 being a constant time discount factor. ht denotes hours of work and ct stands for
consumption by each household. Period-by-period the households face a budget constraint given by
Bht + etB
f
t + Ptct + Ptit = Rt−1Bt−1 + etR
?
t−1B
f
t−1 + Ptwtht + Ptztkt − Ptτt − Pt
χ
2
(etB
f
t )
2, (2.2)
with Bht , B
f
t being domestic and foreign currency bonds and Rt the interest received thereof. It
is costly to hold foreign currency bonds as indicated by χ2 (etB
f
t )
2. The foreigners do not hold any
domestic bonds so aggregate Bht equals 0. Pt is the nominal price of the domestic final good and et the
nominal exchange rate, i.e. the value of domestic currency in terms of foreign currency; wt is the real
wage; kt the amount of physical capital held by households and leased to the firms for rental rate zt.
Finally, τt is a lump-sum tax paid to the government and used to finance government consumption.
Physical capital is assumed to evolve according to
kt+1 = it
(
1− ϕk
2
(
it
kt
− δ
)2)
+ (1− δ)kt, (2.3)
and the parameter ϕk implies that capital accumulation is costly. Notice that δ ∈ [0, 1] is the
depreciation rate of capital. In the steady state, adjustment costs of capital are zero (ϕk equals 0).
The households choose a sequence for {ct, ht, Bht , B
f
t , kt and it}, which yields the following first
order conditions:
Uc,t = ΛtPt, (2.4)
−Uh,t = ΛtPtwt, (2.5)
ΛtPt = Qt
(
1− ϕk
(
it
kt
− δ
))
, (2.6)
Λt = βRtEtΛt+1, (2.7)
Λt(1 + χetB
f
t ) = βR
?
t Et
et+1
et
Λt+1, (2.8)
Qt = βEt
[
Λt+1Pt+1zt+1 + Qt+1
(
1− δ + ϕk
2
((
it+1
kt+1
)2
− δ2
))]
, (2.9)
where Λt and Qt denote the Lagrange multipliers of the first and second constraint respectively.
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2.2 Final goods firms
The economy is comprised of two types of firms, the first type producing final goods and the sec-
ond intermediate goods. The retailer firm combines foreign and domestic goods to produce a non–
tradable final good. It determines its optimal production plans by maximizing its profit
max
{xdt ,x
f
t }
Ptyt − Px,txdt − etP?x,tx
f
t , (2.10)
where Px,t and P?xt denote the price of the domestic and foreign good respectively, denominated
in terms of the currency of the seller. Particularly this means that I assume producer currency pricing
and purchasing power parity for traded goods, i.e. PF,t = etP?x,t, where a ? denotes foreign currency
price. The final good production function is described by the following constant elasticities of scale
(CES) function
yt =
(
ω
1
1−ρ xdt
ρ
+ (1−ω)
1
1−ρ x ft
ρ) 1ρ
. (2.11)
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is measured by parameter ρ ∈
(−∞, 1). Parameter ω ∈ (0, 1) is inversely related to the degree of home bias in preferences and is
thus a natural index of openness. As shown in the appendix (A.1), the optimal behavior of the retailer
gives rise to the demand for the domestic and foreign goods
xdt =
(
Px,t
Pt
) 1
ρ−1
ωyt and x
f
t =
(
etP?x,t
Pt
) 1
ρ−1
(1−ω)yt, (2.12)
Foreign firms behave symmetrically to the domestic firms, such that their demand function for
the domestic good reads
xd?t (i) =
(
Pxt(i)
etP?xt
)−θ
xd?t . (2.13)
Plugging these demand functions in profits and using free entry in the final good sector, we get
the following general price indexes:
Pxt =
(∫ 1
0
Pxt(i)1−θdi
) 1
1−θ
, (2.14)
Pt =
(
ωP
ρ
ρ−1
xt + (1−ω)(etP?xt)
ρ
ρ−1
) ρ−1
ρ
(2.15)
The latter equation (2.15) is the consumer price index (CPI).
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2.3 Intermediate goods firms
The final goods firms buy the goods from intermediaries which all have monopoly power for the
good they produce. Each domestic intermediate goods firm i ∈ [0, 1] producing an intermediate
good x(i), using physical capital k(i) and labor h(i) as input factors, faces a constant returns-to-scale
production function of the form:
xt(i) = atkt(i)αht(i)1−α (2.16)
where at is an exogenous stationary stochastic technology innovation to be specified latter on. The
intermediate goods firms get their inputs of production from perfectly competitive markets, meaning
that their production plan is determined by minimizing their real cost subject to (2.16). Minimized
real total costs are then given by stxt(i) where the real marginal cost, st, is given by
st =
zαt w
1−α
t
ςat
with ς = αα(1− α)1−α, and it therefor follows that wt = (1− α)st px,txtht and zt = α
px,txt
kt
The price setting mechanism is the same as for a closed economy and is explained in detail in the
appendix (A.2). I assume that firms set prices in a staggered fashion à la Calvo (1983). Firms adjust
their prices infrequently, i.e. in each period there is a constant probability 1− ξ that the firm will be
able to adjust its price and a fraction ξ to keep the price unchanged. The firms fix their price for a
random number of periods.
From equation (2.16) and (A.24) I obtain an expression for aggregate output, ∆txt = atkαt h
1−α
t
2.4 Monetary policy
I will study the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy shocks under various specifications of mone-
tary policy. The monetary policy itself depends on the way the exchange rate regime is characterized.
Under flexible exchange rates, the central bank pursues an inflation and output stabilization target
by setting the nominal short-term interest rate, given the policy by a typical Taylor-type rule:
log(Rt) = ρr log(Rt−1) + (1− ρ)
(
log(R) + γπ(log(πt)− log(π)) + γy(log(yt)− log(y))
)
(2.17)
where ρr is the persistence of the rule and γπ, γy are the weights that the central bank assigns
to the inflation rate πt and output yt to get as close to the targets π and y. In this case the nominal
exchange rate is free to adjust in accordance with the equilibrium conditions of the model. Besides
the policy of a Taylor rule, among others the central bank can also follow the policy of:
• stabilizing completely the CPI (πt = Pt/Pt−1 = 1)
• stabilizing the domestic price inflation (πx,t = Px,t/Px,t−1 = 1)
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• or by giving the stabilization of exchange rate fluctuations a weight in the Taylor rule.
Under an exchange rate peg, the monetary authority is required to maintain the exchange rate
stable at its steady state level. I will implement this by requiring that in equilibrium, ∆et = et/et−1 = 1.
For the government to fix the exchange rate, it must stand ready to buy or sell domestic currency to
maintain the nominal exchange rate at its level. To do so, the central bank has to adjust its money
supply or work with open market operations.
2.5 Fiscal policy
The government consumes a domestically produced final good and finances its expenditures by
lump-sum taxes. I assume for simplicity that there is no government debt and that the stationary
component of government expenditures follows an exogenous stochastic AR(1) process:
log(gt+1) = ρg log(gt) + (1− ρg) log(g) + εg,t+1 (2.18)
where ρg is the persistence of the shock and εg,t+1 is the exogenous shock.
2.6 Foreign economy
The behavior of the foreign economy is assumed to be very similar to the one observed domestically.
For simplicity and because the foreign economy is assumed to be very large such that domestic
shocks do not affect foreign output nor the price level, I model the foreign output and prices as
exogenously determined AR(1) processes. Further I assume that the foreign countries internal price
level is equal to its CPI, i.e. P?x,t = P
?
t . The foreign household’s saving behavior is the same as in the
domestic economy (absent preference shocks), such that the foreign nominal interest rate is given by
y?t
− 1σ = βR?t Ety
?
t+1
− 1σ P
?
t
P?t+1
(2.19)
where it is assumed that foreign households have a standard separable utility function3 and
where c? = y?.
2.7 Calibration
Before turning to the evaluation of different household preferences and the transmission of fiscal
policy shocks under different exchange rate regimes, it is instructive to characterize the transmission
mechanism under the baseline model outlined in this section and assuming a monetary policy of
floating exchange rates. As I am mostly interested in investigating the effects of fiscal policy for a
generic rather than a specific real world economy, I use parameter values that are commonly used in
the literature.
3U = c
1−σ
1−σ −
ψ
1+ν h
1+ν
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Table 1: Benchmark Parameters
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Subjective discount factor (quarterly)
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
g/y 0.200 Government share
wh/y 0.600 Labor share
h 1/3 Hours in steady state
ω 0.850 Degree of openness
ρ 1/3 Substitutability between domestic and foreign good
χ 0.010 Portfolio adjustment cost
ϕk 2.000 Capital adjustment
ξ 1-1/4 Price stickiness
θ 6.000 Elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods
ρr 0.800 Persistence in interest rate rule
γπ 1.500 Weight on inflation target
γy 0.100 Weight on output target
ρg 0.970 Fiscal shock: persistence
σε,g 0.008 Standard deviation of fiscal policy shock
The benchmark calibration of my baseline model is given in Table 1.4 Note that the calibration
of household preferences will be specified in the next section, as the corresponding parameters σ,
ν and ψ depend crucially on the form of preferences assumed. Time is measured in quarters. The
discount factor β is then set at a value which is consistent with a riskless interest rate of 4% per year.
The parameter ξ for price stickiness implies that on average 75% of the prices adjust within one year.
Also note that θ equals 6 which leads to a constant steady state markup of 1.2. Government share in
output is assumed to be 20% and we assume that the shock of fiscal policy is highly persistent with
ρg equals 0.970. In the zero-inflation steady state these specifications lead to a consumption share c/y
of 63% and a share of investment i/y of 17%.
Finally, if the monetary policy is given by a Taylor rule, then the central bank sets γπ equals 1.5
and γy equals 0.1. By doing so, the central bank puts a high weight on the stabilization of inflation
and a relatively low weight on the stabilization of output.
In what follows, I will use the canonical model outlined in this section and analyze, how the spec-
ification of the utility function and household preferences matters for the transmission mechanism of
fiscal policy shocks.
4The steady state of the economic framework outlined above is outlined in the appendix (B.1).
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3 Household preferences
In this section, I will analyze in detail various specifications of household preferences which ap-
pear frequently in the business cycle literature. Much of the literature concerning the transmission
mechanism of fiscal policy shocks focuses on closed economy models. I will use the theoretical in-
sights from the closed economy an apply them to the small open economy. The baseline assumption
of additively separable preferences as in Gali and Monacelli (2005) are a good starting point and I
will show the wealth effect, particularly the negative relation between hours worked and private
consumption. Then I will depart from the assumption of additively separable utility functions and
introduce complementarity between hours worked and consumption. There exists a necessary and
a sufficient condition for which the wealth effect is overturned. I show by numerical simulations of
the different utility functions and for various parameter values, that the wealth effect is crucial for
the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy shocks to private consumption.
3.1 Separable utility
I will call the model with separable preferences baseline because it is the standard case in the business
cycle literature and it has some nice features to calculate the steady state and for linearization and
simulation. Assume that households have preferences described by the within-period utility function
U(ct, ht) =
{
ln(ct)− ψ h
1+ν
t
1+ν if σ = 1 ,
c1−σt
1−σ − ψ
h1+νt
1+ν if σ 6= 1 ,
(3.1)
with σ being the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and ν being
the inverse of the Frish labor supply elasticity. It can be seen that Uc(ct, ht) > 0 and Uh(ct, ht) < 0, but
more importantly, it holds that Uc,h(ct, ht) = Uh,c(ct, ht) = 0, i.e. the separability assumption implies
that the cross-derivatives are zero.
Figure 1: Baseline model, changing σ
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By combining equations (2.4) and (2.5), the condition for an efficient labor market is obtained
ψcσt h
ν
t = wt = (1− α)st
px,txt
ht
. (3.2)
From this condition the negative relation between hours worked and consumption is clearly visi-
ble. If a shock to government spending achieves an increase in hours worked, and thus the real wage
falls, then for both sides of the equation to be equal, cσt has to fall by more than wt does. The dynamic
effects of this baseline specification in equilibrium will be shown in section 4.1. The corresponding
steady state conditions for λ and ψ come from equation (2.4), where I obtain a simple expression
c−σ = λ, and from equation (2.5), which can be solved for ψ = (1− α)λys/(h1+ν).
As mentioned by Hall (2009), changes in the parameter σ can alleviate but not avoid the property
of consumption to decline with higher government purchases. For a low σ the decline is larger as
for a high σ. Figure (1) shows the numerical simulation of the benchmark model for a change in
parameter σ. For the small open economy it holds that government spending will crowd-out private
consumption for any high values of σ or ν. It can be concluded that for additively non-separable
utility functions the wealth effect is also present in a model of a small open economy, and the intuition
behind this outcome is the same as for the closed economy case.
3.2 Non-separability
An alternative to the preference relation that is additively separable is to introduce complementarity
of consumption and hours worked. There are several different ways, this complementarity can be
introduced and how the non-separable utility function can be specified. Most importantly, what all
functions have in common is that the above stated condition Uc,h(ct, ht) = Uh,c(ct, ht) = 0 does not
hold anymore. The preference specifications outlined below pertain to a family of kernels that satisfy
balanced growth conditions as mentioned in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988). For σ > 1 the utility
function is more curved than in the log-case, and Uc,h > 0, such that when a person moves from
non-work to work or when hours worked increase, the marginal utility of consumption, and therefor
consumption increases. In the case that σ < 1 we get that Uc,h < 0 and a raise in hours worked
decreases marginal utility of consumption.
Preferences as in Hall (2009)
In a first step I will set out a general non-separable preference function as in Hall (2009) which is an
ad-hoc variation of the separable case described above
U(ct, ht) =
c1−σt
1− σ − ϕc
1−σ
t h
1+ν
t − ψ
h1+νt
1 + ν
. (3.3)
Here positive values of ϕ introduce an increase in the marginal utility of consumption that de-
pends on hours of work. The labor market condition is then given by
10
h1+νt
[
−ϕ(1 + ν)c1−σt − ψ
]
= wtc−σt
[
1− ϕ(1− σ)h1+νt
]
. (3.4)
With this type of specification it is easy to see that for σ > 1 it holds that
Uc,h = −ϕ(1− σ)c−σt (1 + ν)hνt > 0. (3.5)
For the closed economy it has been shown by Linnemann (2006) and Bilbiie (2009) that the condi-
tion Uc,h > 0 is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition to be able to explain the crowding-in of
private consumption in response to a fiscal policy shock. The sufficient condition has to link employ-
ment with the marginal utility of consumption and this link has to be strong enough to overturn the
wealth effect and render positive impulse responses. To obtain a general expression for labor supply,
in a first step the households efficiency conditions for consumption and employment choice (equa-
tions (2.4) and (2.5)) can be combined. Then the real wage can be eliminated through the marginal
product of labor and by using the time constraint. Linearizing this expression around a constant
steady state yields the following expression5
αk̂t +
[
ξh
(
h
1− h
)
− α
]
n̂t = ξc ĉt, (3.6)
with ξh =
(
Ull(1−h)
Ul
− Ucl(1−h)Uc
)
and ξc =
(
Ulcc
Ul
− UcccUc
)
. Given that the capital stock k̂t is a prede-
termined variable and is thus not affected on impact by a fiscal policy shock, equation (3.6) traces out
an implicit relation between hours worked and consumption. Particularly, the sufficient condition
for a shock to government purchases to have a positive effect on consumption is fulfilled if and only
if
[
ξh
(
h
1−h
)
− α
]
> 0. With this condition given, I am now able to state for any specification of utility
function what parameter values have to be assigned in order to get a positive consumption response.
First, it is noteworthy to see that under the case of a separable utility function it holds that
Uc > 0, Uh < 0.6 Neither the necessary nor the sufficient condition are satisfied for this case, which
leads to the conclusion that for neither value of σ nor ν the response will be positive. For the form of
preferences presented by Hall (2009), the point made by Linnemann (2006) shows exactly that com-
plementarity needs to be strong enough. Complementarity is introduced through the parameter ϕ.
It is straightforward that when ϕ equals 0 we are back in the separable framework.
A numerical simulation with the calibrated benchmark model and a preference specification ac-
cording to Hall (2009) where σ equals 2.0, ν equals 0.1 and ϕ equals 1.0 still leads to a negative
response of private consumption (see Figure 2a). Hence the complementarity is not strong enough
at unity. As shown in Figure 2b, complementarity needs to be unjustifiably high in order to return a
positive response. It can be seen that if ν is held constant, then a positive response is more likely to
5see Appendix C for details
6Together with Uc,h(ct, ht) = Uh,c(ct, ht) = 0.
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Figure 2: Hall Preferences and Complementarity
(a) Preferences à la Hall (2009) with changing ϕ
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(b) Coefficient > 0 yields positive response of consumption
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be obtained for high values of σ. In Figure 2a the response becomes positive for a value of ϕ > 3, and
this can be validated with Figure 2b, where the coefficient is slightly positive (0.1398).7
Preferences as in Basu and Kimball (2002)
Another way of introducing complementarity to households preferences is proposed by Basu and
Kimball (2002). They question the approach of assuming an additively separable utility function
because maintaining it leads to an overestimation of the intertemporal elasticities of substitution in
consumption which would make the income effect of a permanent increase in wages much stronger
than the substitution effect. In contrast, empirical evidence on long-run labor supply suggests that
both effects are approximately equal. They further recognize that the assumption of additively sepa-
rable utility functions has been popular in the literature because of its simplicity.
The form of utility introduced in their paper is similar to the one in Linnemann (2006) and López-
Salido and Rabanal (2006). It reads
U(ct, ht) =
(cγt (1− ht)1−γ)1−σ
1− σ . (3.7)
In this framework σ represents the relative risk aversion while 0 < γ < 1 is the weight the
household puts on consumption and leisure respectively. The labor market equilibrium will be given
by the expression
ct
1− ht
1− γ
γ
= wt. (3.8)
7The condition boils down to 0 < (−ν− α)− (1−σ)ϕ(1+ν)h
1+ν
(1−ϕ(1−σ)h1+ν) ; Further, for ϕ > 7 the system is indeterminate.
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As pointed out by Linnemann (2006), utility specifications of this form are not able to produce a
positive impulse response. The reason thereof is because the composite parameter ξh = −1 < 0 for
the closed economy, and this also holds for the open economy. This can be underlined by numerical
simulations for different values of σ, which show that the consumption response is getting closer to
0 by increasing σ, but remains negative (given in Figure 3).
Figure 3: Preferences à la Basu and Kimball (2002) with changing σ
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Preferences à la Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988)
So far I have only considered utility functions which incorporate the Hicksian wealth effect: As
government spending increases, the consumers face a negative wealth shock from higher taxes in
the future and as a consequence, they consume less leisure today. Households allocate more hours
to work and thus the labor supply curve shifts downward. If there is no wealth effect on labor
supply, the curve does not shift, particularly, consumption responds to an increase in hours worked,
while real wages do not inherit fluctuations in consumption. These preferences have been introduced
by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) (GHH) and allow for an arbitrarily small Hicksian
wealth effect on labor supply. Similar preferences have also been considered by Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2003) and Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009).
I assume the following period utility specification
U(ct, ht) =
1
1− σ
[
ct − ψ
(
ht
1 + ν
)1+ν]1−σ
. (3.9)
The parameters assigned have the same interpretation as above, and the labor market equilibrium
can be written as
ψ
ht
1 + ν
ν
= wt. (3.10)
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It can be immediately seen that an increase in real wages has no direct effect on household con-
sumption in this specification. For this kind of preferences one can show that Uc,h > 0, but ξh < 0
depends on the values assigned to ν. Thus, for low values of labor supply elasticity a positive re-
sponse of consumption is obtained, which is confirmed by the numerical simulations (see Figure
4).
Figure 4: Preferences à la Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) with changing σ
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The parameter on risk aversion only has a small influence on the models dynamics as it does not
affect the wealth effect. Crucially, by this type of utility function the transmission mechanism of an
expansion in fiscal policy is clearly visible. The wealth effect essentially works through the Frisch
labor supply elasticity which in this case is exactly ν. The higher this parameter is, the higher is the
substitution effect when wages raise, i.e. in log-linear form equation 3.10 reads νĥt = ŵt. When
wages increase by 1%, then households allocate their time to hours worked proportionally by νĥ.
Preferences as in Linnemann (2006)
Finally, Linnemann (2006) imposes an utility function which satisfies the sufficient condition and
treats consumption and hours worked as complements. He proposes to assume a period utility
function of the following form
U(ct, ht) =
{
ln(ct) + h1+νt if σ = 1 ,
1
1−σ c
1−σ
t h
1+ν
t if σ 6= 1 .
(3.11)
It is straightforward to see that Uc > 0, Uh < 0 and Uc,h < 0 which satisfies the necessary con-
dition. The sufficient condition is satisfied as ξh = (1− h)/h. It follows that the labor market clears
with
1 + ν
σ− 1 h
ν+1
t c
1−σ
t = wt. (3.12)
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A result of this type of specification is that the parameters σ and ν are not independent anymore.
In the appendix (D) I will outline the derivation of the linkage which imposes the following restriction
on ν:
ν =
µ−1p (σ− 1)(1− α)
γc
− 1 (3.13)
with µ−1p being the inverse of the mark-up and has a value of 1.2 in the steady state, γc is the share
of steady state consumption on output, and α is the capital share in production. Hence, all else equal,
ν is increasing in σ.8
Figure 5: Preferences à la Linnemann (2006) and changing σ
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Figure 5 simulates the effect of government spending on consumption with the calibrated param-
eters from the benchmark model. It is clearly visible that the complementarity between consumption
and employment is strong enough to offset the wealth effect and that it entails a positive hump-
shaped response of private consumption, i.e. a positive cumulative multiplier. The intuition is that
higher employment increases the marginal utility of consumption directly, which induces a higher
private consumption all else left equal.
The analysis of the dynamics in Figure 5 shows that with an increasing value of σ the response of
private consumption slightly decreases. Monacelli and Perotti (2006) simulate the model by letting
σ vary and holding ν constant and vice versa. The parameter σ characterizes the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. A high value means a low elasticity and
households strongly wish to smooth consumption over time. The savings motive is also related to the
reaction of the real interest rate. When the real interest rate increases after a shock, then the consumer
is induced to shift the consumption into the future and save today, i.e. current consumption would
not raise as much. Hence, as with a higher σ the consumption response decreases, this must be either
8This part follows section 8.1 in Monacelli and Perotti (2006).
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due to the real interest rate or the implied change in ν.9 The interdependence of σ and ν through
the steady state restriction implies that ν must increase when σ increases. A higher value of ν causes
a lower impact of the wealth effect on hours worked and private consumption. In sum, a higher σ
leads to a higher ν, which decreases the wealth effect of a government spending shock and thus the
complementarity effect on private consumption will be smaller.
4 The transmission mechanism under different exchange rate regimes
In what follows I will present in a first step the dynamics of the baseline model outlined in section 2
and compare the dynamic responses to a fiscal policy shock under different exchange rate regimes.
A comparison across exchange rate regimes is meaningful since movements in the exchange rate
play the stabilizing role of adjusting international relative prices in response to shocks, when prices
are sticky and slow down the process of price adjustment in the local currency (Corsetti, 2007). In a
second step I will compare the different specifications of utility functions and their dynamic impulse
responses under a floating and pegged exchange rate regime.
4.1 Dynamic response in the baseline model
In the next two subsections I will focus on the equilibrium dynamics given by an exogenous fiscal
spending shock. As I already explained the mechanism of the wealth effect in section 3, I will stick
to the broader stylized facts here. Figure 6 shows the dynamic response of selected variables to a
1% shock to government spending in the domestic economy. The benchmark calibration is given in
subsection 2.7 and the household adopts a felicity function as outlined in subsection 3.1. To under-
stand the basic transmission mechanism it is instructive to start with the simplistic case of separable
preferences. What happens when another form of preference function is assumed will be shown in
the next subsection. The central bank can pursue different policy rules as mentioned in subsection
2.4. Standard is a floating exchange rate where the monetary authority has an inflation and output
stabilization target given by a Taylor rule. All the responses are measured in percentage deviations
from the steady state.
A first notable result is that, under either specification of monetary policy, the response of output
is positive and smaller than unity throughout. This is already quite different from the predictions of
the Mundell-Flemming model for a small open economy with perfect capital mobility. Nonetheless,
if comparing the fixed exchange rate regime with a float under the Taylor rule, the response of output
is larger in relative terms for the former. Under a floating regime, output raises on impact by roughly
0.1%, under a fixed exchange rate it is an increase of 0.17%.
On the real side of the model the dynamics are driven by the well-known wealth effect of gov-
ernment spending. An increase in government consumption withdraws resources from the private
sector and reduces private wealth. As households smooth consumption over time, they will reduce
current consumption because they assume that the government will increase taxes at some point
9The effects of the real interest rate will be discussed in the next section
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in the future to balance the budget and pay its spendings. Therefore, the households allocate time
from leisure to work. The increase in labor supply causes real wages to fall and reduces households
income. Under the assumption of separable preferences the standard result is obtained that con-
sumption falls because of the reduced wealth. Quantitatively, the outcome does not depend on the
monetary policy of the central bank. Only if the authority follows a Taylor rule, the effect is slightly
more negative.
Further notable results in Figure 6 concern the response of the monetary sector. On impact, the
response of domestic inflation and of CPI-inflation is negative under a float or for fixed exchange
rates. The targeting of either of these two measurements of inflation does not have a quantitatively
different effect. Under a peg, inflation falls beneath its steady state value for about ten quarters,
whereas it takes much more time for accommodation under a float. The reason for the fall in prices
comes from the firms sector: An increase in government spending lowers the real wage, which lowers
the real marginal costs of the intermediate goods producing firms. The firms adjust their prices and
because of price stickiness they adjust slowly.
Figure 6: Baseline SOE model with different monetary policies
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This has direct effects for the policy rate. Under a float, the Taylor rule implies that the policy rate
falls to stabilize inflation. As the coefficient in the rule γπ equals 1.5 is larger than one, the interest rate
will be lowered by more than the drop in inflation. If the central bank has a strict target of the CPI or
of domestic inflation, then she wants to have πt = πx,t = 1 to all ends. As an outcome of the general
equilibrium, the real interest rate is no longer controlled by the central bank but depends on the
households saving-consumption decision in order to ensure stable long-run consumption growth.
If households consume less today then in order to smooth consumption over time the interest rate
must raise and vice versa. When the exchange rate remains credibly pegged to its initial level, the
long-run purchasing power parity requires domestic prices to revert to their initial steady state level.
Last, under a floating exchange rate regime, the real exchange rate appreciates on impact, i.e. the
prices of the domestic economy relative to the foreign economy increase. This comes from the fact
that under this regime, capital is moved to the foreign economy because the interest rate drops. In
the case of an exchange rate peg or strict (CPI) inflation targeting, capital does not leave the domestic
economy, rather there is a capital inflow and capital accumulates in the domestic economy, which
leads to a real exchange rate depreciation on impact. Over time, the dynamics show that the real
exchange rates converge to one path which is due to the fact, that under a float the interest rate raises
again and leads to a capital inflow after five quarters.
4.2 Dynamic responses of different utility functions
After having described the dynamics under the benchmark model with separable preferences I will
revisit in this subsection the effect of different preference specifications. I will simulate the system
for a floating exchange rate given in Figure 7 and for an exchange rate peg shown in Figure 8. The
calibration remains as outlined above, for the households I assume a standard value for σ equals 2.
Where necessary, ν equals 0.100 and in the non-separable utility function by Hall (2009) I assume a ϕ
equals 3.10
Under a floating exchange rate regime, the dynamics are dominated by the utility specification
mentioned in subsection 3.2. Under this type of nonseparability, the output response closely reaches
1 after several periods. Nevertheless it is the only function, which has a negative response on impact.
This outcome is mainly driven through the negative response of investment, which falls sharply on
impact. An increase in government spending produces a fall in the Tobin’s q, which depends (via the
asset price condition in equation (B.13)) on the current and future movements in the real marginal
costs and the real interest rate. As mentioned above, the marginal costs decrease because of the
decrease in the real wage.
For the GHH preferences, consumption raises above its steady state level on impact. After five
periods, consumption falls below the steady state level, and so do investment and output. The pref-
erence specification by Hall (2009) is chosen so that the response is positive in the long-run and the
complementarity between hours and private consumption is clearly visible. The preferences with
10In a fixed exchange rate regime, the preference specification according to Linnemann (2006) has a unit root for σ equals
2, I thus adopt a value of 2.5.
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wealth effect after Basu and Kimball (2002) show a negative response of private consumption and
only a small positive effect on output. Investment deviates negatively from steady state on impact
but returns quickly to its initial steady state level. These preferences are not very rich of dynamics
and represent a very stable system of equations.
The analysis of monetary policy has several interesting features. First, the response of inflation
is positive only for the GHH specification, where inflation does not return to its steady state level
even after 40 quarters. The monetary policy weakly affects the households saving-consumption de-
cision for this type of preferences. The real exchange rate appreciates over the observed time period,
induced by an inflow of capital through the higher interest rate. The other specifications show con-
trary movements. For the non-separable preferences specified by Linnemann (2006), the real interest
rate falls sharply on impact inducing an exchange rate depreciation. The monetary authority lowers
the real interest rate to follow its monetary target of stabilizing inflation.
In comparison with the model dynamics of separable preferences described above it can be seen
that the specification by Hall (2009) shows very similar results. The largest differences are obtained
by the nonseparability according to Linnemann (2006), which goes back to the mentioned wealth
effect. Under a floating exchange rate regime, the monetary authority accommodates through the
adjustment of the interest rate the consumption response of households which leads to an assimila-
tion in the long run.
What happens when the monetary authority drops the instrument of setting the interest rate and
pegs the interest rate is given in Figure 8. In this setup, private consumption has a positive response
under GHH and Linnemann preferences, but the effect for GHH lasts only for a few quarters. The
dynamics for output, investment and private consumption are similar to the ones under a floating
exchange rate regime. The effect of a government spending shock on output is positive but smaller
than one, which is a contradiction to the traditional Mundell-Flemming model outcome.
Monetary policy pegs the nominal exchange rate and looses control over the real interest rate. For
all the specifications the response of the real interest rate is small but positive. The real exchange rate
depreciates except for the GHH preferences, which is due to the outflow of capital. Inflation increases
on impact for the Basu and Kimball (2002) and GHH preferences. This is due to the instantaneous in-
crease in demand for goods and services, making them more scarce and lead producers to raise their
prices. In the model with Linnemann preferences the impulse response is similar to the benchmark
model but stronger. The real wage decreases due to the higher supply in labor which leads to lower
marginal costs and a decrease in prices.
To sum up this section, the following points are noteworthy. First, the traditional results from
the Mundell-Flemming model are rejected in a small open economy with rational expectations and
nominal rigidities. The impulse responses to a transitory stochastic one percent increase in govern-
ment spending lead to a positive output response under a floating exchange rate regime as well as
under an exchange rate peg. The response of private consumption depends crucially on the assump-
tions made about the utility function. Under a float, monetary policy controls the real interest rate
and dampens the effects on inflation and the real exchange rate. Under a peg, fiscal policy is more
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Figure 7: Comparison of Utility Functions under a Float
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effective as the multiplier on output is relatively larger than under a float.
5 Robustness and extensions
First I will analyze the robustness of the obtained equilibrium dynamics by imposing real rigidities.
So far the simulated models featured nominal rigidities in the form of sticky prices and I studied
the effect of a 1% increase in government spending under different specifications of utility functions
and different monetary policy choices. I now explore the effect of real rigidities based on the base-
line model and the model with a preference specification according to Linnemann (2006). The real
rigidities are imposed through a simple habit formation mechanism outlined in the next subsection.
Monetary authority controls the real interest rate by following a Taylor rule. The calibration of the
model remains unchanged. Second I will outline as an extension a further variant of utility func-
tion by assuming that government spending gives some utility to households and that there exists a
complementarity between private consumption and public spending. For the analysis of the impulse
responses to a government spending shock, the underlying framework is again the baseline model.
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Figure 8: Comparison of Utility Functions under a Peg
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5.1 Habit persistence
The objective of including a process of habit formation into the utility function is usually justified by
looking at the aggregate data. Habit formation is a key to capture the hump-shaped gradual response
of spending and inflation to shocks. The nominal side of the model stays as before, only the utility
function for the consumers is slightly adjusted. Habit persistence is an ingredient which gives past
consumption a weight in determining current utility. An individual’s utility thus depends on current
consumption relative to past consumption.11
5.1.1 The baseline model with habits
The model setup remains basically the same as in section 3. What changes is the utility function of
households which for the benchmark case of separable utility reads
11Among many others the paper by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) assumes this sort of preference specifica-
tion with the aim of studying the dynamic effects of a shock to monetary policy.
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U(ct, ht) =
(ct − bct−1)1−σ
1− σ − ψ
h1+νt
1 + ν
, (5.1)
where 0 < b < 1 measures the degree of habit persistence. For a value of b equals 0 we obtain the
standard benchmark model. As a consequence of this form of utility function, equation (B.1) adjusts
to
(ct − bct−1)−σ = λt. (5.2)
In steady state ct = ct−1 = c and thus (c− bc)−σ = λ.
The equilibrium dynamics for a 1% increase in government expenditures and a range of values
for b are given in Figure 9. At first sight it stands out that only the impulse response functions for
consumption significantly change. This is because the nominal side of the model is left unaltered.
Private consumption responds less negatively on impact the larger the degree of habit formation.
It can be seen that if the degree for b equal to 0.9, then private consumption has almost a positive
response on impact. The reason for these dynamics is that consumption is now a predetermined
variable and its initial value is the steady state. On impact the response will always be negative
because of the wealth effect, but the larger b the less is the deviation from steady state on impact. The
smaller the degree of habit formation, the faster private consumption converges to the dynamics of
the baseline model.
5.1.2 Linnemann preferences with habits
To be able to compare the outcome of habit formation under separable preferences I use the prefer-
ence specifications presented in subsection 3.2. Again, everything is left unchanged but the utility
function which now reads
U(ct, ht) =
1
1− σ (ct − bct−1)
1−σh1+νt . (5.3)
This implies a change not only in equation (B.1) but also in (B.2) as the cross-derivative Uc,h also
changes. The two equations take the following forms
(ct − bct−1)−σh1+νt = λt, (5.4)
1 + ν
σ− 1 h
ν+1
t (ct − bct−1)1−σ = wt. (5.5)
This means that through the complementarity between hours and private consumption the labor
market is also affected through the habit formation and the response of private consumption when
the real wage decreases through the increase in labor supply (wealth effect), the consumption re-
sponse will be dampened. This means that the response of consumption is expected to be less strong
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Figure 9: Baseline Model with Habit Persistence
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under the model with habit persistence than in the model where b equals 0. But before turning to the
analysis of equilibrium dynamics, the steady state of the model has to be adjusted. In steady state,
the parameters ν and σ are interdependent through the relation
ν =
µ−1p (σ− 1)(1− α)
γc(1− b)
− 1. (5.6)
Figure 10 displays the equilibrium dynamics after the system was hit by a 1% shock in govern-
ment spending. As described above, the response of private consumption gets smaller on impact
but also the deviations are less strong over time. The habit formation absorbs the complementarity
effect and dampens the effect of the shock. Generally it can be said that the larger the degree of habit
persistence, the less the variables react. A difference to the model with separable preferences is given
by the dynamics of the nominal variables. Because of the complementarity between hours worked
and private consumption, not only the latter reacts to a shock but also the former. If the habit forma-
tion absorbs the wealth effect and consumption does not react by as much, then households will not
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Figure 10: Linnemann Preferences with Habit Persistence
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increase as much their labor efforts, which leads to a smaller reduction in the real wage and thus to a
smaller decrease in prices and inflation.
5.2 Including government spending into the utility function
Another approach to overcome the crowding-out effect of government spending on private con-
sumption is by assuming that public expenditures affect consumer preferences. It can be assumed
that the government uses its expenditures for public goods which yield utility to the households.
Bouakez and Rebei (2007) develop a simple business cycle model where they specify a utility func-
tion which depends on private consumption as well as on public spending.12 In the literature there
has been an ongoing discussion about whether private consumption and public spending are com-
plements or substitutes.13 For the purpose of the paper it is instructive to assume that they are
complements, such that an increase in government spending will increase the marginal utility of
12Bouakez and Rebei (2007) introduce in their model habit persistence to obtain a persistent and hump-shaped consump-
tion response as obtained in their VAR. I will restrict the analysis to a simple one period utility function.
13See per example Amano and Wirjanto (1997) or Evans and Karras (1994) among others.
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consumption, which in turn reduces the wealth effect.
Figure 11: Government Spending in Utility Function
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Effective consumption takes the form of constant elasticities of scale and is a compound of private
consumption and government spending:
c̃t =
[
φc
ς−1
ς
t + (1− φ)g
ς−1
ς
t
] ς
ς−1
, (5.7)
where φ ∈ [0, 1] corresponds to the weight of private consumption in the effective consumption
index, and ς > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between private consumption and government
spending.14 The functional form of households instantaneous preference function is in line with the
separable preferences from subsection 3.1
U(ct, ht) =
c̃t1−σ
1− σ − ψ
h1+νt
1 + ν
. (5.8)
14In the special case where ς is equal to 0, ct and gt become perfect complements; for ςto∞ they become perfect substi-
tutes.
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The calibration of the model is standard as before. The central bank follows a Taylor rule and lets
the exchange rate float. Household preferences are calibrated with σ equals 2, ν equals 0.10 and ψ
depends on the steady state value of λ which in turn depends on the parametrization of ς and φ. I
will simulate the model for three different scenarios as performed in Bouakez and Rebei (2007), by
setting the elasticity of substitution ς to 0.9, 0.45, 0.25 respectively. The weight of private consumption
φ is set to 0.8.
The results from the simulations are displayed in Figure 11. For ς equal to 0.9 the responses
are very much alike to the benchmark model. Private consumption is crowded-out, hours worked
increase by 0.1%, the central bank responds to the decrease of inflation by lowering the real interest
rate and the real exchange rate depreciates, i.e. the foreign goods have become more expensive. By
setting ς to 0.45 private consumption and government spending become complements and it can
be clearly seen that the response on private consumption is close to zero. Overall, the dynamics
are still similar to the dynamics described before, but the effect of a government spending shock is
less strong. This means that in this case the complementarity is rather weak and cannot offset the
wealth effect. What happens when the rate of complementarity is increased is given by the dynamics
when ς is set to 0.25. As in Bouakez and Rebei (2007), it holds also for the small open economy
that the complementarity effect is strong enough to dominate the wealth effect and the consumption
response is positive from impact. The crowding-in of private consumption leads to a higher response
of government spending on output. The households increase on impact their hours worked by 0.3%,
which has consequences on the real side of the model. As prices decrease, the real interest rate is
lowered sharply on impact. The decrease in domestic prices leads to a stronger depreciation of the
real exchange rate.
In summary, the inclusion of habit formation to the separable baseline utility function does not
help to obtain a positive response of private consumption to a government spending shock. Further,
under the assumption of non-separable preferences, the habit leads to a lower response on private
consumption as the households want to hold their consumption path flat over time. The larger the
weight of the habit, the smaller the response on private consumption. By imposing that households
get some utility from government spending, and by introducing a strong enough complementarity,
the wealth effect on private consumption is overturned and the response is positive.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have analyzed the impact of an expansionary fiscal policy shock in a small open
economy. The transmission mechanism of such a shock is driven by the wealth effect, which causes
households to shift their time allocation from leisure to work. In a baseline model with separable
utility, the wealth effect and the consumption smoothing motive of households drive down private
consumption, a finding which has been questioned in the recent empirical literature on the impact of
fiscal policy shocks.
I have simulated the model for five different types of utility functions, four of which are addi-
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tively non-separable and thus characterized by complementarity between hours worked and private
consumption. In accordance with Linnemann (2006) and Bilbiie (2009), who show that complemen-
tarity can overturn the wealth effect under certain conditions, I contribute to the existing literature by
extending the model to an open economy framework. Another innovation is to compare the response
of selected variables under the different utility functions and exchange rate regimes.
Three important remarks about my results are worth noting. First, the simulations show that
not for each non-separable specification of the utility function the response of consumption is posi-
tive. This result puts into perspective the conclusion by Monacelli and Perotti (2006), who state that
non-separable preferences help to reconcile the theory with the data. Moreover, I found a sufficient
and necessary condition to be satisfied by the utility function in order to obtain an effect of private
consumption which is positive.
Second, it holds that for utility functions which fulfill the condition, the calibrated complementar-
ity needs to be large. It is a finding of the paper, that the calibration of the parameters requires strong
assumptions for all the specifications to render a positive response. Whether the required calibration
and the outlined model assumptions can be justified by the data is left for future research.
Finally, I also found that by changing the exchange rate regime from a float to a peg, the response
of private consumption and output are relatively stronger, which confirms the traditional findings
of the Mundell-Flemming model. Nevertheless, the traditional wisdom that output is completely
crowded-out under a floating exchange rate regime is not supported by the model with nominal
rigidities and optimizing agents.
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A Model
A.1 Optimal expenditure allocation of retailer
The retailer produces the final good according to the following CES function
yt =
(
ω
1
1−ρ xdt
ρ
+ (1−ω)
1
1−ρ x ft
ρ) 1ρ
(A.1)
The composite index yt consists of xdt , being an index of consumption of domestic goods and
x ft respective for foreign goods. Both indexes are described by a constant elasticities of scale (CES)
function. For the domestic good this reads xdt ≡
(∫ 1
0 x
d
t (i)
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
, with i ∈ [0, 1] denoting the good
variety consumed. x ft , the index for imported foreign goods, reads similarly x
f
t =
(∫ 1
0 x
f
t (i)
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
where θ ∈ (−∞, 1).
Assuming the case of monopolistic competition where agents set the prices of goods and inputs
in order to maximize their objectives, here firms are going to choose optimal production of xdt and x
f
t
subject to their expenditures, zt. Let’s take by way of example production of the domestic good xdt (i):
The problem of maximization of xdt (i) for any given expenditure level
∫ 1
0
Px,t(i)xdt (i)di +
∫ 1
0
etP?x,t(i)x
f
t (i)di ≡ zt (A.2)
can be formalized by means of the Lagrangian
L =
[∫ 1
0
xdt (i)
θ−1
θ + x ft (i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
− λ
(∫ 1
0
Px,t(i)xdt (i)di +
∫ 1
0
etP?x,t(i)x
f
t (i)di− zt
)
(A.3)
The associated first order condition (FOC) for xdt (i) is
xdt (i)
− 1θ xdt
1
θ = λPx,t(i) (A.4)
for all i ∈ [0, 1]. Thus for any two goods (i, j),
xdt (i) = x
d
t (j)
(
Px,t(i)
Px,t(j)
)−θ
(A.5)
After some substitution we obtain the demand function for
xdt (i) =
(
Pxt(i)
Pxt
)−θ
xdt , x
f
t (i) =
(
P?xt(i)
P?xt
)−θ
x ft
Analogously, the problem of maximization of xdt and x
f
t can be solved similarly using the composite
consumption index yt. This yields the optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and
foreign goods:
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xdt =
(
Px,t
Pt
) 1
ρ−1
ωyt and x
f
t =
(
etP?x,t
Pt
) 1
ρ−1
(1−ω)yt (A.6)
The domestic price index is given by
Pxt =
(∫ 1
0
Pxt(i)1−θdi
) 1
1−θ
(A.7)
A.2 Pricing mechanism
The price setting behavior is essentially the same as in a closed economy. The expected profit flow
generated by setting P̃t(i) in period t writes
max
P̃x,t(i)
Et
∞
∑
j=0
Φt,t+jξ jΠ(P̃x,t(i)) (A.8)
subject to the total demand it faces:
xt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−θ
xt with xt = xdt + x
d?
t (A.9)
and where Π(P̃x,t(i)) =
(
P̃x,t(i)− Pt+jst+j
)
xt+j(i). Φt,t+j is an appropriate discount factor related to
the way the household value future as opposed to current consumption, such that
Φt,t+j ∝ βj
Λt+j
Λt
(A.10)
This leads to the price setting equation
Et
 ∞∑
j=0
(βξ)j
Λt+j
Λt
(1− θ)( P̃x,t(i)
Px,t+j
)−θ
yt+j + θ
Pt+j
Px,t+j(i)
(
P̃x,t(i)
Px,t+j
)−θ
st+jxt+j
 = 0 (A.11)
from which it shall be clear that all firms that reset their price in period t set it at the same level
(P̃t(i) = P̃t, for all i ∈ (0, 1)). This implies that
P̃x,t =
PNx,t
PDx,t
(A.12)
where
Pnx,t = Et
[
∞
∑
j=0
(βξ)jΛt+j
θ
θ − 1 Pt+jP
θ
x,t+jst+jxt+j
]
(A.13)
and
Pdx,t = Et
[
∞
∑
j=0
(βξ)jΛt+jPθx,t+jxt+j
]
(A.14)
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Fortunately, both PNx,t and P
D
x,t admit a recursive representation, such that
Pnx,t =
θ
θ − 1ΛtPtP
θ
x,tstxt + βξEt[P
n
x,t+1] (A.15)
Pdx,t = ΛtP
θ
x,txt + βξEt[P
d
x,t+1] (A.16)
Recall now that the price index is given by
Px,t =
(∫ 1
0
Px,t(i)1−θdi
) 1
1−θ
(A.17)
In fact it is composed of surviving contracts and newly set prices. Given that in each an every period
a price contract has a probability 1− ξ of ending, the probability that a contract signed in period t− j
survives until period t and ends at the end of period t is given by (1− ξ)ξ j. Therefore, the aggregate
price level may be expressed as the average of all surviving contracts
Px,t =
(
∞
∑
j=0
(1− ξ)ξ jP̃1−θx,t−j
) 1
1−θ
(A.18)
which can be expressed recursively as
Px,t =
(
(1− ξ)P̃1−θx,t + ξP1−θx,t−1
) 1
1−θ
(A.19)
Note that since the wage rate is common to all firms, the capital labor ratio is the same for any
firm:
kt(i)
ht(i)
=
kt(j)
ht(j)
=
kt
ht
(A.20)
we therefore have
xt(i) = at
(
kt
ht
)α
ht(i) (A.21)
integrating across firms, we obtain∫ 1
0
xt(i)di = at
(
kt
ht
)α ∫ 1
0
ht(i)di (A.22)
denoting ht =
∫ 1
0 ht(i)di, and making use of the demand for yt(i), we have∫ 1
0
(
Px,t(i)
Px,t
)−θ
diyt = atkαt h
1−α
t (A.23)
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Denote
∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
Px,t(i)
Px,t
)−θ
di
=
∞
∑
j=0
(1− ξ)ξ j
(
P̃x,t−j
Px,t
)−θ
= (1− ξ)
(
P̃x,t
Px,t
)−θ
+
∞
∑
j=1
(1− ξ)ξ j
(
P̃x,t−j
Px,t
)−θ
= (1− ξ)
(
P̃x,t
Px,t
)−θ
+
∞
∑
`=0
(1− ξ)ξ`+1
(
P̃x,t−`−1
Px,t
)−θ
= (1− ξ)
(
P̃x,t
Px,t
)−θ
+ ξ
(
Px,t−1
Px,t
)−θ ∞
∑
`=0
(1− ξ)ξ`
(
P̃x,t−`−1
Px,t−1
)−θ
= (1− ξ)
(
P̃x,t
Px,t
)−θ
+ ξ
(
Px,t−1
Px,t
)−θ
∆t−1
and we get
∆t = (1− ξ)
(
P̃x,t
Px,t
)−θ
+ ξπθx,t∆t−1 (A.24)
B General equilibrium
The deflated general equilibrium is then given by
Uc,t = λt (B.1)
−Uh,t = λt(1− α)st
px,txt
ht
(B.2)
λt = qt
(
1− ϕk
(
it
kt
− δ
))
(B.3)
yt = ct + it + gt +
χ
2
b f 2t (B.4)
∆txt = atkαt h
1−α
t (B.5)
xdt = p
1
ρ−1
x,t ωyt (B.6)
xd?t =
(
px,t
rert
) 1
ρ−1
(1−ω)y?t (B.7)
x ft = (rert p
?
x,t)
1
ρ−1 (1−ω)yt (B.8)
xt = xdt + x
d?
t (B.9)
1 = ωp
ρ
ρ−1
x,t + (1−ω)(rert p?t )
ρ
ρ−1 (B.10)
λt = βRtEt
λt+1
πt+1
(B.11)
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λt(1 + χb
f
t ) = βR
?
t Et
∆et+1
πt+1
λt+1 (B.12)
qt = βEt
[
λt+1αst+1
px,t+1xt+1
kt+1
+ qt+1
(
1− δ + ϕk
2
((
it+1
kt+1
)2
− δ2
))]
(B.13)
b ft =
∆et
πt
R?t−1b
f
t−1 + px,txt − yt (B.14)
kt+1 = it
(
1− ϕk
2
(
it
kt
− δ
)2)
+ (1− δ)kt (B.15)
rert =
∆et p
?
t
πt p?t−1
rert−1 (B.16)
px,t =
πx,t
πt
px,t−1 (B.17)
log(Rt) = ρr log(Rt−1) + (1− ρ)
(
log(R) + γπ(log(πt)− log(π)) + γy(log(yt)− log(y))
)
(B.18)
pnx,t =
θ
θ − 1λt p
θ
x,tstxt + βξEt[p
n
x,t+1π
θ
t+1] (B.19)
pdx,t = λt p
θ
x,txt + βξEt[p
d
x,t+1π
θ−1
t+1 ] (B.20)
px,t =
(1− ξ)( pnx,t
pdx,t
)1−θ
+ ξ
(
px,t−1
πt
)1−θ 11−θ (B.21)
∆t = (1− ξ)
(
pnx,t
px,t pdx,t
)−θ
+ ξ∆t−1πθx,t (B.22)
y?t
− 1σ = βR?Ety?t+1
− 1σ p
?
t
p?t+1
(B.23)
where λt = ΛtPt, rert = etP?t /Pt, px,t = Px,t/Pt, p
n
t = P
n
t /P
θ
t , p
d
t = P
d
t /P
θ−1
t , πt = Pt/Pt−1, πx,t =
Px,t/Px,t−1, ∆et = et/et−1.
All possible shocks follow AR(1) processes of the type
log(at+1) = ρa log(at) + εa,t+1 (B.24)
log(gt+1) = ρg log(gt) + (1− ρg) log(g) + εg,t+1 (B.25)
log(y?t+1) = ρy log(y
?
t ) + (1− ρy) log(y) + ε?y,t+1 (B.26)
log(p?t+1) = ρp log(p
?
t ) + (1− ρp) log(p) + ε?p,t+1 (B.27)
but in this paper I will only focus on shocks to government expenditures (B.25)
B.1 Steady state
Next follows a characterization of the zero inflation (πt = Pt/Pt−1 = 1) perfect foresight steady state
for the canonical small open economy model outlined above. This is needed in order to be able to
linearize the system around the deterministic steady state, as the system outlined above is non-linear.
Foreign output y? is taken as given and there is no shock ε̃a,t = 0, ε̃g,t = 0, ε̃a f ,t = 0 so gt = 1, for
all t. Standard arguments establish the existence of a steady state with yt = y, πt = Pt/Pt−1 =
Px,t/Px,t−1 = P?x,t/P
?
x,t−1 = 1, hence the real exchange rate is also 1 in steady state.
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The variables in the steady state have no time subscript. From equation (B.11) it follows that the
steady state real interest rate is, R = 1/β, the inverse of the time discount rate.
From the pricing mechanism (equations (B.19) and (B.20)) in steady state it holds that pnx = pdx,
and thus I obtain the common result that in the steady state the real marginal costs are constant
s = (θ−1)θ , i.e. the inverse of the mark-up. The wage paid by firms is equal to all households and
reads w = (1− α)s pxxh . The steady state amount of working hours supplied by households h as well
as the labor share wh/y are values to be calibrated and hence given. Knowing this I can solve for the
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor α which is α = 1− (wh)/(ys)
In steady state, capital adjustment costs are assumed to be zero, i.e.
(
1− ϕk2
(
it
kt − δ
)2)
= 1, thus
with equation (B.13) I can solve for the capital to output ratio k/y:
k/y = αβs/(1− β(1− δ)) (B.28)
and with equation (B.15) for the investment to output ratio i/y = δ(k/y). From the market
clearing equation (B.4), given that in steady state portfolio adjustment costs χ = 0, I obtain the
consumption to output ratio: c/y = 1− i/y − g/y where we know that g/y is calibrated prior to
the simulation. Given these great ratios, I am now able to solve for steady state output y, capital k,
investment i, consumption c and government spending g:
y = (k/y)
α
1−α h and then k = (k/y)y, i = (i/y)y, c = (c/y)y, g = (g/y)y (B.29)
Note that these steady state values so far do not depend on the specification of the utility function.
Yet, to get an expression for λ, pdx, pnx the form of specification matters. Generally, it holds that
λ = Uc and pdx = (λy)/(1− βξ) with pdx = pnx (B.30)
C Relation between consumption and hours worked
Combining equations (B.1) and (B.2) yields
wtUc,t(ct, 1− ht) = Ul,t(ct, 1− ht) (C.1)
By linearizing this equation around its non-stochastic steady state, I obtain:
ŵtwUc,t + wUcc,tcĉt − wUcl,thĥt = Ulc,tcĉt −Ull,thĥt (C.2)
Dividing equation (C.2) by (C.1) and including ŵt = αk̂t − αĥt, after some rearranging equation
3.6 in the text is obtained.
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D Interdependence of ν and σ
In steady state we know the capital to output ratio k/y given in equation (B.28). We also know that
in steady state marginal costs are equal to the inverse of the mark-up: s ≡ µ−1. From the production
function we know that y = kαh1−α which leads to the capital-labor ratio:
k/h =
(y
k
) 1
α−1
=
(
1− β(1− δ)
αβµ−1
) 1
α−1
(D.1)
From the household optimization and the labor market clearing we know that equation 3.12 in
steady state reads
w =
1 + ν
σ− 1 (c/h) = (1− α)µ
−1(k/h)α (D.2)
whereas it is possible to solve for the consumption-employment ratio:
(c/h) = w =
σ− 1
1 + ν
(1− α)µ−1(k/h)α (D.3)
Making use of the market clearing equation (B.4) in steady state we can write
((k/h)α − δ(k/h)) h− g = c (D.4)
Combining the last two equations an expression for steady state employment can be obtained:
h =
g
(k/h)α
[
1− σ−11+ν (1− α)µ−1
]
− δ(k/h)
(D.5)
and from the consumption to employment ratio we can solve for an expression of consumption
to output (c/y) ≡ γc:
γc =
σ− 1
1 + ν
(1− α)µ−1 (D.6)
which finally leads to an expression where the interdependence of σ and ν gets clear and is equa-
tion (3.13) in the text:
ν =
µ−1p (σ− 1)(1− α)
γc
− 1 (D.7)
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